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Abstract
We test whether eligibility for the Renta Dignidad social pen-
sion mitigates old-age poverty and induces (in)direct behavioural
responses by using a regression discontinuity design as the age cut-
off determining eligibility is set at 60. We find that, first, neither
poverty nor consumption or labour supply are affected by spouses’
eligibility and, second, the probability of co-residing grandchildren
in households with both spouses eligible is higher. We contribute to
the literature by showing how the role of gender in decisions with an
intergenerational component can help rationalising apparent limita-
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1 Introduction
Since more than 50% of jobs are informal and pay no social security in
the developing world, in the last 20 years governments in 60 countries
worldwide paid up to 1% of GDP to enact social pensions with the aim of
mitigating old age poverty (Bosch et al., 2013). In this paper we try to gain
a better understanding of the reasons why a social pension enacted in 2008
in Bolivia, Renta Dignidad, has a take-up of only about 60%, which poses
a challenge to achieve its objective of mitigating poverty by paying about
25% of per capita income or 60 US dollars in PPP (Bosch et al., 2013).
First, we test whether the gender of eligible elderly spouses affects take-
up within a household, to better understand whether gender differences
in spouses’ ability to take all necessary administrative steps to obtain the
pension or complementarities in the event of eligibility by both spouses
are at play. This is instrumental to then study whether eligibility leads
to a decrease in poverty incidence, which is about 50% when considering
households with elderly spouses in Bolivia.
Second, we assess whether eligibility induces behavioural responses and
whether they are gendered if spouses’ preferences exhibit high enough het-
erogeneity, which may lead to a bargaining process between spouses, or
whether they exhibit gender complementarities when both spouses are el-
igible and may coordinate on how to use the pension income. We focus
on consumption and labour supply, i.e. direct responses, because the pen-
sion income shock may allow to buy the same consumption bundle with
a lower labour supply, to keep labour supply unchanged and afford more
consumption, or a combination of both. In addition, the pension income
may induce indirect behavioural responses. Since extended families are a
frequently observed arrangement to cope with children and elderly care in
developing countries, we focus on testing whether eligibility modifies the
composition of a household.
We identify the effect separately by spouse’s gender thanks to a bi-
dimensional regression discontinuity design (RDD), with spouses’ age as
forcing variables, since individuals become eligible when turning 60. We
estimate the effect by using data from the 2008 and 2009 waves of the
Bolivian household survey. We find that eligibility leads to a significant
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“jump” in take-up (from 0% to about 60%). The only significant gender
differences are observed when we consider heterogeneity by wealth, with
take-up being lower for eligible females while higher when both spouses are
eligible in wealthy households. However, the observed differences in take-
up are not sizable enough to lead to a proportional decrease in poverty
incidence. Similarly, when we look at consumption and labour supply we
do not find a significant eligibility effect by spouses’ gender.
When we look at household composition, we find that the probability of
observing co-residing grandchildren is higher when both spouses are eligible
(50 pp or 280%), while that of observing an elderly couple’s adult children
is unchanged. Importantly for our research design validity, the distribution
of spouses’ age and baseline characteristics are continuous at the 60 cutoff,
which rules out sizable sorting by individuals in or out of the pension.
Additional tests show that our results are robust to using a different age
range than 50-70 and are not confounded by an anticipation effect, i.e.
borrowing before becoming eligible to then repay using the pension income,
or by a placebo effect, i.e. behavioural responses by spouses turning 60
before the pension was enacted.
Our paper contributes to the growing number of related studies on social
pensions in Mexico and in Latin America and, in particular, to two closely
related studies on Bolivia (Escobar Loza et al., 2013; Hernani-Limarino and
Mena, 2015). Most of them find, although using different empirical specifi-
cations, that consumption increases while labour supply decreases for eligi-
ble individuals. Our paper complements them by focusing on eligibility by
spouses’ gender in a household and by finding evidence of complementar-
ity in spouses’ eligibility effect on a decision over household composition,
namely co-residing grandchildren.
In addition, we contribute to two studies that have identified gender
effects using data on the South African Old Age Pension (Edmonds, 2006;
Ardington et al., 2009) and find evidence of an increase in children’s school-
ing and in young adults’ employment, respectively. Our paper complements
them by showing that in a poorer country than South Africa a less gen-
erous social pension induces a qualitatively similar indirect effect on non-
beneficiaries although more muted as eligibility leads only to an increase
in time invested by grandparents in their grandchildren’s care.
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The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 puts our
paper in context in the related literature. Section 3 describes the insti-
tutional setting and the data. Section 4 describes the empirical research
design and its validity while section 5 presents the results. Finally, section
6 discusses the results and concludes. Additional results can be found in
the Appendix.
2 Literature review
Our paper complements related studies on social pensions in Mexico and
in a number of countries in Latin America including Bolivia as, differently
from all of them, it explicitly looks at the role played by spouses’ gender
and household wealth in explaining differences in take-up and decisions over
the amount and type of expenditure induced by eligibility for the Renta
Dignidad pension. Social pensions enacted in these regions over the last 20
years have eligibility rules based on age cutoffs, they were discontinued over
time in Bolivia and they are restricted to residents of a region in Mexico.
These rules make estimating the eligibility effect for one or more house-
hold members possible by using either regression discontinuity, difference
in difference, propensity score matching or a combination of these designs.
This is typically done by focusing on the age of the eldest member in a
household to compare food expenditure in households in which the eldest
member’s age is past the eligibility cutoff with others in which the eldest
member is younger, accounting for incomplete take-up where relevant and
focusing only on households whose eldest member age is close to the cutoff
in the case of regression discontinuity. In our paper we, instead, compare
the behaviour of the following groups of households: those in which both
spouses are eligible for a pension, those in which only one spouse is eligible,
with particular attention to the role played by gender of the eligible spouse,
and those in which no spouse is.
Our paper is closely related to two studies on the Renta Dignidad pen-
sion. Escobar Loza et al. (2013) study the eligibility effect by using a
regression discontinuity design in which the forcing variable is the age of
the eldest member of a household. The data used was obtained on purpose
for an official evaluation of the pension by using the pool of households from
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the household survey and oversampling those with the eldest member in the
age range 55-65. The main results are that being eligible reduces poverty
and, in addition, increases household consumption. Hernani-Limarino and
Mena (2015) is a related study that uses a refinement of a difference in
difference design, called change-in-change, to identify the counterfactual
outcome for non-eligibles and study quantile treatment effects. This is
done by exploiting the change in cutoff value from 65 to 60 when Renta
Dignidad replaced in 2008 Bonosol, a similar social pension whose age eli-
gibility cutoff was 65. Their main findings are a positive effect of non-labor
income and, for women, a negative one on their labor supply.
Our paper is also related to studies quantifying the effect of Bonosol,
the social pension that was replaced by Renta Dignidad in 2008. Martinez
(2004) studies the effect of receiving at least one pension in a household in
the period 1998-2002. This is done by comparing outcomes of interest for
households in a period in which the pension was discontinued, 1998-1999,
and in a subsequent period in which payments were resumed, 2000-2002, by
way of a difference in difference design used in combination with a regression
discontinuity design to compare (in)eligible households close to the cutoff.
The main results show that consumption is higher, particularly in rural
areas, and, in addition, school enrollment for children is higher. Yanez-
Pagans (2008) studies the effect of the same pension on children’s schooling
by using data on 2001 and a regression discontinuity design to compare
(in)eligibles. The main results are that children’s schooling expenditure is
higher, particularly for non-indigenous women.
In addition, our paper is related to studies of the (in)direct effect of
non-contributory pensions in Mexico and in Latin America. The impact
of the Adultos Mayores pension in Mexico, whose eligibility rules are be-
ing 70 or older and residing in the Federal District in Mexico City, has
been studied by Salinas-Rodr´ıguez et al. (2014) who use a difference in
difference design to exploit the residential eligibility criterion and find that
eligibility decreases depression and increases subjective views on empow-
erment. Galiani et al. (2016) combine a difference in difference with a
regression discontinuity design to exploit both eligibility criteria and find
that mental health improves, a switch is observed from paid work to work
in family businesses and consumption is higher. Gutierrez et al. (2017) fo-
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cus on school enrollment for beneficiaries’ co-residing grandchildren, use a
regression discontinuity design to exploit the age cutoff and find a positive
effect.
When we look at other countries, Pension 65 is a social pension enacted
in Peru for individuals who are 65 or older and live in a household below
the poverty line. Its effect has been studied by Bando et al. (2016) who
use a regression discontinuity design to exploit the poverty-based eligibility
criterion and find that eligibility decreased depression and labour supply
while it increased consumption. In a related study Novella and Olivera
(2017) find with linear and non-linear regressions a negative association
between the score in a cognitive test and retirement. Although the retire-
ment measure does not distinguish different pension types, most elderly in
Latin America only receive a social pension. In Brazil, the Benef´ıcio de
Prestac¸a˜o Continuada pension was enacted for individuals who are 65 or
older. de Oliveira et al. (2017) estimate its effect by using a regression dis-
continuity design to compare (in)eligibles and find a decrease in the labor
force participation of the elders.
Finally, our paper is related to two studies assessing the gender-specific
impact of the Old Age Pension enacted in South Africa in the 1990s for
individuals who are 60 or older. Edmonds (2006) studies the eligibility ef-
fect on school age children by looking at whether the eldest man or woman
are eligible by way of a regression discontinuity whose two forcing variables
are the age of the eldest female and male in a household. The main re-
sults show a large increase in schooling attendance and a decline in total
hours worked when black South African families are eligible for the pension,
with the schooling effect being more pronounced when a male is eligible.
In a related study Ardington et al. (2009) quantify the pension effect on
labor supply of prime-aged adults by using longitudinal data to compare
households becoming eligible and those no longer eligible due to changes
in the household composition over time. They find that the pension in-
creases employment among young adults, which occurs primarily through
labor migration. In addition, while young adults migrate independently
of gender when a woman is eligible, only young male adults migrate when
a man is eligible. This evidence suggests that the pension relaxed house-
hold liquidity constraints and that preferences may be heterogeneous by
5
gender.1
3 Institutional setting and data
Section 3.1 describes the institutional setting of the pension system in Bo-
livia, to clarify how the pension works, while Section 3.2 describes the data
used in the empirical analysis.
3.1 Pension system in Bolivia
Renta Dignidad is not the first non-contributory pension in Bolivia. In
1997, the government enacted Bonosol, a pension paying all citizens who
were 65 or older 1,300 bolivianos per year, that was about 27% of per
capita income and 85% of income for those living in extreme poverty (von
Gersdorff, 1997). Bonosol was part of a broader social and economic reform
agenda with two main aims. The first was reducing high income inequality
in the country, that was in the top quartile of the distribution of countries
worldwide measured using the GINI index (CIA World Factbook, 2014).
The second was dealing with the consequences of the high share of informal
employment, about 60% (World Bank, 2009), which is detrimental as it
does not lead to the accumulation of contributory pension rights over time.
Bonosol was not paid in the period 1998-2000, as it was judged financially
untenable. In 2001, instead, the pension was resumed although its amount
decreased to about 420 bolivianos in 2001-2002, while it increased to 1,800
bolivianos in 2003. Finally, the pension was discontinued in December
2007.2
1Duflo (2003) studies the impact of the South African pension by comparing house-
holds with no pension with those in which a female received it and, also, with those
in which a male received it by instrumenting pension receipt with eligibility. The main
results are a positive impact on anthropometric status, i.e. weight for height and height
for age, for girls but little effect for boys, although only when the pension recipient is a
woman. The main limitation in Duflo (2003)’s identification of gender effects is not as-
sessing whether results are robust to considering only individuals close to the eligibility
age cutoff. Additional studies on the same pension focus on its impact on employment
or on living arrangements, although either only partly or not at all accounting for the
role of beneficiaries’ gender (Bertrand et al., 2003; Edmonds et al., 2005; Posel et al.,
2006; Hamoudi and Thomas, 2014; Tondini et al., 2017).
2See Willmore (2006) for additional information about pension reforms in Bolivia.
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Renta Dignidad was enacted on 1st February 2008 with two main dif-
ferences with respect to Bonosol. First, the age eligibility cutoff decreased
to 60. Second, the amount paid increased to 2,400 bolivianos per year,
except for individuals obtaining a contributory pension and public sector
employees (about 20% of all beneficiaries), who received 1,800 bolivianos.3
Figure 1: Pension types by age eligibility
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In addition to non-contributory pensions, the Bolivian government pays
contributory pensions to individuals who paid social security throughout
their working life. Retirement age for females was 60 while it is 65 for
males. However, it turns out that only about 40% of workers are in the
formal sector and about 20% obtain a contributory pension in the age range
60-65.
Figure 1 shows the different sources of pension income that an individ-
ual obtained per month, measured in bolivianos on the vertical axis, as a
function of age on the horizontal axis. The left-hand side panel shows pen-
sion income for the period 2006-2007, when the Bonosol non-contributory
pension, abbreviated NCP in the figure, was in place. Individuals younger
than 60 were not eligible for any pension income. When turning 60 females
3The first pension payment was made up to a month after an individual turned
60, at either a bank or an authorized military enclosure subject to identity verification.
Alternatively, arrangements were in place to obtain it at home. The pension was paid
on a monthly basis, except for individuals obtaining 2,400 bolivianos who could choose
either monthly or less frequent payments. Additional information is available in Escobar
Loza et al. (2013).
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who had paid social security throughout their working life were eligible for
a contributory pension, abbreviated CP in the figure, of 550 bolivianos per
month while males were only eligible when turning 65. In addition, when
turning 65, both females and males were eligible for Bonosol, which con-
sisted of 150 bolivianos per month. The right-hand side panel shows the
same information although for the period 2008-2009, when Bonosol was
replaced by Renta Dignidad. Similarly to 2006-2007, individuals younger
than 60 were not eligible for any pension income. At 60, all individuals
became eligible for Renta Dignidad, paying 200 bolivianos per month, and
females who had paid social security also received a contributory pension.
Finally, at 65, males who had paid social security also received a contribu-
tory pension.
3.2 Data
We use data from the 2008 and 2009 waves of the Bolivian household survey
(Encuesta de Hogares) run by the Bolivian National Statistics Institute.
Our unit of observation in the data is a household since our treatment of
interest is whether one or more spouses were eligible for the Renta Dignidad
pension in a household and (in)eligibles’ gender. Spouses are defined by
using data on who is the head of the household and who is her/his spouse,
on their gender and on their marital status.4
Testing our hypothesis that the effect of pension eligibility differs by
spouses’ gender requires variation in spouses’ age across households around
the 60 age eligibility cutoff. Figure 2 measures for each household, shown
as circles, the female spouse’s age on the vertical axis and the male’s on
the horizontal one. Although the figure shows that households with either
no spouse or two spouses eligible for a pension are relatively more frequent,
respectively 25% and 45%, the share of households with a spouse eligible
is non-negligible, with about (10)20% in which only the (fe)male spouse is
eligible.Following Escobar Loza et al. (2013), we define as eligible for a pension
a spouse in a household if (s)he was 60 years and a month old since up to
a month elapsed between the time an individual turned 60, submitted the
application for the Renta Dignidad pension and the time the first pension
4The data can be downloaded from section “Banco de Datos” in www.ine.gob.bo.
Alternatively, a copy of our dataset is available upon request.
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Figure 2: Variation in spouses’ age in a household
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payment was made, as illustrated in Figure 3. In addition, in a setting
in which eligibility is based on age and our outcomes of interest are mea-
sured in the yearly household survey in early November, eligible spouses
are those who were 60 or older on 30th September, i.e. one month before
our outcomes of interest were measured in the survey. Non-eligibles are,
instead, those who turned 60 later. Since the survey contains informa-
tion on day, month and year of birth, we can create a precise measure of
age in which the integer part measures age in years while the decimal one
measures fractions of years.5
5Eligible spouses in the 2008 (2009) wave of the survey are those who were born on
30th September 1948 (1949) or earlier.
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We selected the data sample used in our empirical analysis as follows.
We start by considering the full set of 30,695 individuals in the 2008 and
2009 waves of the Bolivian household survey. Subsequently, we collapse
the data at the household level, obtaining 7,974 households. Since in our
analysis we focus on households whose spouses have an age close to the 60
cutoff determining eligibility for Renta Dignidad pension, we restrict our
attention to the 1,048 households in which the eldest individuals of both
sexes are in the 50-70 age range. Finally, when we further restrict our
focus only on those households with two spouses who are both in the 50-70
age range, the number of observations is unchanged, thus suggesting that
all houses in which the eldest female and male are in the 50-70 age range
are households with a married couple with both spouses in that age range.
We chose not to restrict the age range further in our empirical analysis to
ensure that our main results do not suffer from misspecification due to a
number of observations too low to estimate an empirical specification that
allows for heterogeneity by spouse gender in the pension eligibility effect.
We use two poverty measures defined by the National Statistics Institute
in Bolivia. The first is a dummy equal to 1 if total income per capita is
below the poverty threshold, set at 418 bolivianos in the survey data for
2008 and 2009. The second one is a dummy equal to 1 if total income per
capita is below the extreme poverty threshold, set at 218 bolivianos over the
same period. We measure spouses’ labour supply thanks to a dummy set
equal to 1 in the survey data if a given spouse worked over the week before
the survey interview and 0 otherwise. In addition, we define a dummy to
capture whether at least one spouse worked.6
We also include two typically important sources of expenditure for a
household, measured in bolivianos over the month before the survey was
held. The first is total food expenditure, which we obtained by summing
expenditure over all food items, from raw to pre-cooked food. The second is
educational expenditure, which we computed to assess whether households
with one or more spouses eligible for a pension contribute to finance their
grandchildren’s education more than households with no eligible spouse.
Both measures of expenditure are expressed in bolivianos and refer to the
6Poverty threshold values were defined based on the cost of basic food and non-
food consumption needs. Additional details about the survey design can be found in
www.ine.gob.bo.
10
month before the survey interview. We dropped 3 observations whose value
of food consumption was about 100,000 bolivianos as it is suspiciously
high and most likely due to coding error. Finally, we obtained measures
of household composition by setting a dummy equal to 1 if adult sons or
daughters co-reside with their elderly parents and a dummy equal to 1 if
grandchildren lived in the household.
The predetermined characteristics used in our empirical analysis are,
firstly, a dummy for whether one or more spouses in a household belongs
to the Quechua minority ethnicity and a dummy created analogously for
the Aymara ethnicity. In addition, we created dummies for whether at least
a spouse had completed 5 years of education (primary), 8 years (secondary)
or 12 years (post-secondary). To control for a predetermined measure of
health we also created a dummy for whether at least one spouse in a house-
hold was ill in the 4 weeks before the yearly survey was administered in
a household. This measure is predetermined since i) we define as eligible
for a pension those spouses turning 60 at the end of September in a year
and ii) it took approximately a month between the 60th birthday and the
first pension payment and the household survey was conducted between the
end of October and the beginning of November. In other words, the health
dummy is equal to 1 if a spouse was ill between the end of September and
the end of October. Note that a spouse may be ill after turning 60 but,
crucially, before being eligible for a pension. We also created a measure of
household wealth by way of a dummy equal to 1 if at least one spouse had
a private health insurance, which is typically granted by stable jobs with
above median remuneration. Finally, we created a dummy to distinguish
households in urban areas from those in rural ones and a dummy for those
households who participated in the survey in 2009.7
Table 1 shows summary statistics of our outcomes of interest and of
baseline characteristics for households with spouses in a 50-70 age range.
This is done separately by whether no spouse is eligible for a pension when
they are all younger than 60, only one of the two spouses is 60 or older and
therefore eligible, distinguishing by gender, and, finally, all are 60 or older
7Since a free health insurance (Seguro de Salud para el Adulto Mayor) was offered
since 2006 as a universal program to all individuals who were 60 or older, for these
individuals our health insurance dummy is set equal to 0 as they did not pay for health
insurance.
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and therefore eligible.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Both Females 60-70, Females 50-59, Both
50-59 Males 50-59 Males 60-70 60-70
Outcomes
Take-up female 0.02 0.76 0.05 0.81
Take-up male 0.01 0.02 0.76 0.84
Take-up amount (bol.) 6.45 155.39 153.99 313.11
Poverty 0.45 0.51 0.48 0.47
Extreme poverty 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.22
Female working 0.64 0.45 0.59 0.47
Male working 0.91 0.88 0.82 0.79
1+ working 0.95 0.89 0.90 0.84
Food exp. (bol.) 276.78 290.22 301.49 352.42
Food exp. (%) 0.37 0.47 0.42 0.49
Educ. exp. (bol.) 209.76 259.77 143.22 80.98
Educ. exp. (%) 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.06
Co-residing adult children 0.82 0.57 0.66 0.48
Co-residing grandchildren 0.17 0.34 0.30 0.36
Predetermined characteristics
1+ Quechua ethnicity 0.35 0.30 0.38 0.41
1+ Aymara ethnicity 0.33 0.42 0.33 0.30
1+ educ. 5+ years 0.66 0.64 0.53 0.49
1+ educ. 8+ years 0.45 0.39 0.32 0.29
1+ educ. 12+ years 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.21
1+ ill 0.43 0.54 0.57 0.55
1+ health ins. 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.27
1+ contrib. pension 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.23
Urban 0.61 0.59 0.52 0.45
Year 2009 survey 0.49 0.48 0.54 0.49
N 498 67 210 273
The top panel in Table 1 shows that Renta Dignidad take-up increases
discontinuously when at least one spouse is eligible, with non-compliance
being small at about 2%. It also shows that the incidence of poverty is
about 45% when no spouse is eligible, with a slight increase when at least
one spouse is eligible. The incidence of extreme poverty is lower than
30%, being 28% when no spouse is eligible and lower, at 22% when all are
eligible. When we look at labour supply, it is higher for males over females,
ranging from 91% and 64% respectively when no spouse is eligible to 79%
and 47% when all are eligible. When we look at food expenditure, it is
approximately 277 bolivianos or 37% of total expenditure when no spouse
is eligible and it increases to 352 or 49% when both spouses are eligible.
Finally, educational expenditure ranges from about 210 bolivianos or 15%
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when no spouse is eligible to 81 or 6% when all are eligible.
When we look at household composition, the probability of observing
young adults co-residing with their parents is 82% when no spouse is el-
igible, while it is substantially lower when at least one spouse is eligible.
When we look at the probability that grandchildren co-reside with their
grandparents, it is 17% when no spouse is eligible and it is higher other-
wise, with a substantial increase to 36% when both spouses are eligible.
The bottom panel in Table 1 shows means of baseline characteristics.
In 30-40% of households at least one spouse is of Quechua ethnicity with
no sizable difference between the groups defined by spouse eligibility and
similar values hold for Aymara ethnicity. At least one spouse has completed
at least compulsory education (5 years) in 49-66% of households, at least
one has completed at least secondary (8 years) in 29-45% of households,
and at least one spouse completed post-secondary education in in 21-29%
of households.
In addition, the bottom panel in Table 1 shows that the probability of
a sick spell for at least one spouse ranges from 43% for households with no
spouse eligible to 57% for households in which only males are eligible. As
for the frequency of households paying for a health insurance out of their
pocket or through their employer, which is either public (Caja de Salud)
or private, it ranges from 27% when both spouses are eligible to 33% when
only a spouse is. We also report the frequency of households with at least
one spouse receiving a contributory pension, which ranges from 6% when
no spouse is eligible to 23% when all spouses are eligible and the frequency
of urban households, which varies from 45% when all spouses are eligible
to 61% when no spouse is eligible. Finally, the frequency of households in
the data from the 2009 wave of the survey is close to 50% for all the groups
we consider by spouses’ eligibility.8
4 Research design and validity
We describe the empirical research design that we use to estimate whether
the positive income shock induced by spouses’ eligibility for the Renta
8We discuss further evidence on differences in household baseline characteristics by
pension eligibility status in section 4.2.
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Dignidad pension and whether gender differences play a relevant role in
influencing household decisions in section 4.1. In addition, we discuss our
research design validity and offer evidence in support of it in section 4.2.
4.1 Regression discontinuity design
A linear regression of an outcome Y on a dummy D equal to 1 if an indi-
vidual is eligible for a pension and 0 otherwise leads to spurious estimates
if individuals’ unobservable characteristics correlate with eligibility status.
By exploiting the age-based cutoff to be eligible for the pension we can,
instead, estimate a clean effect of pension eligibility locally at the age 60
cutoff thanks to a regression discontinuity design (RDD) since, by focusing
on those individuals whose age is close enough to 60, eligibles and ineli-
gibles are fully comparable in their predetermined characteristics. Since
not all those who are eligible for the pension apply for it, for a variety of
reasons, take-up may be endogenous.
We follow the specification used by Edmonds (2006) to study eligibility
for the South Africa Old Age Pension in two important dimensions. The
first is focusing on eligibility for the pension and identify the intention to
treat effect (ITT) at the cutoff since take-up is endogenous. With incom-
plete take-up at the age 60 cutoff, the ITT effect is a lower bound of the
pension effect on those who actually receive it, the local average treatment
effect (LATE). The second is focusing on eligibility separately for each
spouse as as decisions over consumption, labour supply or household com-
position are typically the outcome of a negotiation between spouses and
may be influenced by whether no spouse, one or both of them are eligible
for a pension, with potential gender differences.
Equation (1) shows the empirical specification that we use to separately
estimate the pension eligibility effect by spouse’s gender on our outcome
of interest Y . We let female spouse’s age be measured by AF , with the
integer part measuring age in years while the decimal one fractions of years.
Eligibility is measured by a dummy DF = {AF ≥ 60} equal to 1 if she is 60
or older, with age and the eligibility dummy being created analogously for
male spouses. Hence, β1 and β2 in equation (1) capture the eligibility effect
when only one spouse is eligible (female and male, respectively) while β3
captures the difference in the effect when both spouses are eligible for the
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pension.
Y = β0 + β1DF + β2DM + β3DFM + (1)
+f(AF − 60, AM − 60, DF , DM) + U
The polynomial f(·) in equation (1) accounts for spouses’ age trends in
our outcomes of interest and is defined in equation (2), with age rescaled
at 60. Parameters from β4 to β8 capture own age trends and are allowed
to differ by whether own age is 60 or greater while β9− β15 capture trends
in spouse’s age or in spouses’ joint age.
f(·) = β4(AF − 60) + β5(AM − 60) + β6(AF − 60)(AM − 60) + (2)
+β7DF (AF − 60) + β8DM(AM − 60) + β9DM(AF − 60) +
+β10DF (AM − 60) + β11DF (AF − 60)(AM − 60) +
+β12DM(AF − 60)(AM − 60) + β13DAFDAM (AM − 60)
+β14DAFDAM (AF − 60) + β15DAFDAM (AM − 60)(AF − 60)
Our research design is a bi-dimensional RDD as we use two running
variables, female and male spouses’ age, to assess the role of eligibility by
spouse’s gender in influencing our outcomes of interest. Edmonds (2006) is
the only other study that uses a similar empirical methodology, to the best
of our knowledge, although it differs from ours as the two running variables
in Edmonds (2006) are age of the eldest man and woman in a household.
The RDD identifying assumption is absence of or imperfect sorting by
individuals on either side of the age 60 cutoff. Although the identifying
assumption is untestable, date of birth and in our setting whether an in-
dividual is barely younger or older than age 60 cutoff on 30th September
2008, the date we use to define eligibles in 2008, are arguably exogenous. In
section 4.2, we carefully assess whether the distribution of spouses’ age, as
well as other predetermined characteristics are continuous at the 60 cutoff,
finding evidence in support of it.
Finally, we assess whether take-up and the pension eligibility effect
vary by household wealth as evidence in the literature suggests that poor
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households tend to be more credit constrained than others (e.g. Martinez,
2004; Edmonds, 2006). We define as a proxy for household wealth a dummy
equal to 1 if one or more spouses in a household pays for a health insurance
policy which, as we discussed in section 3, is more likely to be affordable
by households with stable jobs or by aﬄuent ones.9
We estimate equation (1) using a local linear regression in spouses’ age
rescaled at the 60 cutoff. In all specifications we use a rectangular kernel
of size 10 years, i.e. we estimate a linear regression using a data sample
obtained by considering those households in which both spouses’ age is
within 10 years on either side of the age 60 cutoff. This kernel has been
chosen due to the low number of observations to estimate our empirical
design in the survey data and, in addition, to its simplicity with respect
to more sophisticated ones, since kernel choice tends to have little impact
in practice (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). In addition, the standard error
formula used is robust to heteroskedasticity and we also correct standard
errors by using the sampling weights in the survey. Finally, we add as
baseline characteristics dummies for ethnicity, education, health status and
insurance, eligibility for a contributory pension, residential area and survey
year.10
4.2 Research design validity
The untestable RDD identifying assumption is that individuals are unable
to sort themselves into the treated group, or out of it, by manipulating, for
example, their age or date of birth. We offer evidence in support of this
assumption by assessing empirically whether the age distribution by spouse
gender is smooth at the age 60 cutoff and, similarly, whether individuals’
baseline characteristics are balanced at the cutoff.11
9We estimate the heterogeneous pension effect by wealth by letting DHI be a dummy
equal to 1 if at least one spouse in a household has a health insurance and by multiplying
the terms in equation (1) by (1 + DHI). The parameters associated to DF · DHI ,
DM · DHI and DFM · DHI measure the difference in the pension eligibility effect for
wealthy households relative to others.
10Sample weights are the same when data are used at the individual or at the house-
hold level since the number of households in the primary sampling unit in the survey
varies from 80 to 350 based on population density.
11See Lee and Lemieux (2010) for a discussion of RDD identifying assumption and
validity.
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Figure 4: Age distribution
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The top panel in Figure 4 shows age histograms, separately by spouse
gender in a household, with the histogram bin set to 90 days to ensure
that discontinuities can be detected visually. Visual inspection suggests no
suspicious “jump” in histogram bins height at the cutoff, hence supporting
the validity of the research design. This result is confirmed by density-based
tests of the null hypothesis of no manipulation (McCrary, 2008). They are
reported in the bottom panel in Figure 4 and show that confidence intervals
of the difference in age density fitted values, indicated as dashed lines in
the figure, overlap at the 60 cutoff. While the main diagnostic for sorting of
individuals at the cutoff in a RDD excludes significant sorting, we observe a
number of spikes in the histograms in the top panel in Figure 4 at a number
of integer age values such as 59 and 61. Although clearly identifying the
determinants of such spikes is beyond the scope of our analysis, we speculate
that they may be due to demographic factors, since we measure age at the
end of September 2008 and 2009.
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Table 2: Balance of baseline characteristics at the age 60 cutoff
1+ ethnicity Education (years)
Quechua Aymara 5+ 8+ 12+
DF 0.156 -0.137 0.290 0.085 0.140
(0.172) (0.181) (0.178) (0.180) (0.166)
DM 0.002 -0.154 0.267
∗ 0.148 0.041
(0.151) (0.149) (0.161) (0.144) (0.130)
DM*DF -0.053 0.026 -0.535
∗∗ -0.230 -0.228
(0.242) (0.238) (0.245) (0.231) (0.211)
N 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048
Bandwidth 10 10 10 10 10
JE = DF +DM +DF ∗DM 0.105 -0.266 0.022 0.003 -0.047
P-value (JE=0) 0.538 0.085 0.894 0.980 0.706
Mean value (inel. HH) 0.333 0.321 0.661 0.452 0.315
Health Contributory Household characteristics
sick spell insurance pension urban survey in 2009
DF -0.143 -0.027 0.066 -0.298 -0.003
(0.176) (0.164) (0.138) (0.185) (0.183)
DM -0.125 0.056 0.128 -0.222 0.013
(0.154) (0.142) (0.100) (0.157) (0.160)
DM ∗DF 0.020 -0.014 -0.135 0.105 -0.210
(0.239) (0.216) (0.180) (0.246) (0.246)
N 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048
Bandwidth 10 10 10 10 10
JE = DF +DM +DF ∗DM -0.248 0.015 0.058 -0.415 -0.201
P-value (JE=0) 0.126 0.914 0.556 0.011 0.218
Mean value (inel. HH) 0.426 0.299 0.058 0.476 0.574
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In the absence of manipulation we also expect no difference in base-
line characteristics when we compare individuals who were barely younger
than 60 with those who were barely older, as such characteristics are pre-
determined. Table 2 shows estimates obtained by regressing each of our
baseline characteristics, whose list is reported in Table 1, on age dummies
and a RDD polynomial in age using equation (1). For each baseline char-
acteristic, we report estimates of the eligibility dummies by spouse gender
(DF and DM), as well as the joint eligibility effect (DF +DM +DF ∗DM),
together with the p-value of the null hypothesis of no joint effect. Overall,
Table 2 shows that differences in baseline characteristics at the cutoff are
small and not significant. The same results are obtained when varying the
bandwidth, except for a significant difference for Quechua ethnicity by fe-
male spouse eligibility, although only for bandwidth value 10. They can be
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found in Figure A.1 in the Appendix.12
Since in our research design we focus on pension eligibility of one or
both spouses in a household, we quantify in Table A.1 in the Appendix
the extent of endogenous sorting, which may alter couple formation, by
regressing a dummy equal to 1 if the (female) male spouse is not observed
in a household on the RDD specification for pension eligibility for the other
spouse, after adding to our dataset on households with both spouses ob-
servations on single-spouse households. Non-significant coefficients of the
eligibility dummies in Table A.1 suggest that endogenous sorting is not a
major threat to our research design.13
In short, our findings confirm that that self-selection into the pension
in households in which no spouse is eligible is not a concern empirically
and, in addition, that those households in which at least one spouse is
eligible and those in which no spouse is eligible are similar in a rich set of
predetermined characteristics.
5 Results
We firstly show estimates of the pension take-up, of poverty and labour
supply by spouses’ eligibility by gender and also separately by our proxy
for household wealth in section 5.1. Secondly, we show estimates of the pen-
sion eligibility effect on household composition in section 5.2. In addition,
we discuss the robustness of our main results to varying the age bandwidth
in section 5.3 and quantify ant(posti)icipation and placebo effects in sec-
tion 5.4. Finally, in section 5.5 we compare and contrast our main results
with additional ones obtained by using a different specification in which
we estimate the effect of eligibility for the youngest and eldest spouse in a
household, thus disregarding gender effects.
12Results obtained using polynomial plots of baseline characteristics, estimated sep-
arately by whether individuals are at least 60 and by gender are in line with those in
Table 2 and can be found in Figure A.2 in the Appendix.
13We ran the same regressions as in Table A.1 except using as outcomes dummies
for whether the marital status was widow, divorced or separated to assess whether any
of them was induced by eligibility and found no evidence in support of this. We do not
report these estimates although they are available upon request.
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5.1 Take-up, poverty and consumption
We start by graphically assessing the effect of pension eligibility on take-
up by gender. Figure 5 shows fitted RDD second order polynomials (thick
continuous lines) and confidence intervals (dashed lines) of the total pen-
sion amount received by a household, obtained separately by whether each
spouse was 60 or older. In addition, we show, as circles, mean values by
age.
Figure 5: Pension amount received monthly in a household by spouse’s
gender
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Two facts can be observed when looking at Figure 5. First, being
individually eligible for the pension discontinuously increases the amount
received by the household, as the non-overlapping confidence intervals at
the cutoff show, separately for each spouse. Second, a small although non-
zero amount is received in households on the left hand-side of the age 60
cutoff, with the amount being greater for females. This suggests that more
than one spouse may be eligible for the pension in a household since non-
compliance is very low, as shown in Table 1.14
Hence, failing to account for the possibility that more than one spouse in
a household can be eligible for a pension can lead to biased RDD estimates,
even though the research design is valid at the individual level. We thus
formally quantify take-up by eligibility status separately by spouse’s gender
estimating equation (1) with the pension amount as dependent variable.
14The results are similar if we measure take-up using a dummy equal to one if a
spouse received the pension and 0 otherwise, as shown in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
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We report the estimates in Table 3. The first two columns show estimates
of the pension amount, respectively excluding and adding as controls the
baseline characteristics described in section 4.1. We report estimates by
spouse gender (DF and DM), as well as the joint effect (JE = DF +DM +
DFM), together with the p-value of the null hypothesis of no joint effect.
In Table 3 we also report estimates of a model allowing for heteroge-
neous take-up by whether a household paid for health insurance in columns
(3) and (4), respectively excluding and adding controls. In addition to es-
timated parameters associated to eligibility dummies by spouse (DF and
DM), we report estimates of the health insurance dummy (HI), of its in-
teractions with the eligibility dummies and of the following p-values: of
the test that spouses’ joint eligibility effect (JE) is zero and of the test
that the heterogeneous joint effect for wealthy households, i.e. HJE =
DF ∗HI +DM ∗HI +DFM ∗HI +HI, is zero.
Table 3: Pension amount and poverty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pension amount Poverty prob.
DF 138.039
∗∗∗ 139.122∗∗∗ 180.312∗∗∗ 177.337∗∗∗ 0.017 0.063 -0.021 0.085
(28.582) (27.755) (27.814) (28.070) (0.188) (0.189) (0.212) (0.224)
DM 108.516
∗∗∗ 109.572∗∗∗ 108.318∗∗∗ 111.198∗∗∗ -0.049 0.016 0.067 0.079
(24.739) (24.377) (28.902) (28.650) (0.162) (0.142) (0.199) (0.183)
DFM -48.065 -42.138 -110.180
∗ -100.328∗ 0.145 -0.006 0.069 -0.128
(51.527) (49.541) (59.414) (58.072) (0.257) (0.246) (0.294) (0.292)
1+ health ins. (HI) -11.351 42.760∗ 32.857 -0.143∗∗∗ -0.486∗∗ -0.259
(6.917) (25.199) (25.905) (0.045) (0.231) (0.210)
DF ∗HI -147.626∗∗ -136.859∗∗ -0.127 -0.296
(68.925) (64.183) (0.344) (0.345)
DM ∗HI 5.517 0.225 -0.332 -0.252
(47.413) (47.201) (0.299) (0.263)
DFM ∗HI 298.891∗∗∗ 277.779∗∗∗ 0.473 0.729
(95.884) (92.343) (0.455) (0.463)
JE = DF +DM +DFM 198.490
∗∗∗ 206.557∗∗∗ 178.449∗∗∗ 188.207∗∗∗ 0.113 0.073 0.115 0.037
P-value (JE=0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.517 0.663 0.577 0.859
HJE = HI(1 +DF +DM +DFM) 199.542
∗∗∗ 174.003∗∗∗ -0.473∗∗ -0.078
P-value (HJE=0) 0.000 0.001 0.040 0.769
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048
Mean value (55-59) 6.426 0.460
S. D. (55-59) 36.149 0.499
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3 show that the Renta Dignidad pension
amount is significantly higher when the female spouse is eligible for the
pension (about 140 bol.), when the male is (about 110 bol.) and when
both spouses are (about 200 bol.). Compared to the ideal situation of
full compliance, we observe that households receive, on average, half the
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amount expected. This is consistent with a probability of receiving the
pension varying between 49-66 percentage points, as shown in Table A.2
in the Appendix. When focusing on the heterogeneous take-up of the pen-
sion by health insurance in columns (3) and (4), we observe that take-up is
significantly lower when only the female spouses is eligible in wealthy house-
holds, although this results is not robust when we vary the bandwidth, as
shown in Figure A.3 in the Appendix; take-up is also significantly higher
in households with a health insurance and two eligible spouses (about 280
bol.) and robust to changing the bandwidth.
In addition, since pension eligibility may lead to a mechanical increase
in household income, Table 3 shows in the last four columns estimates of
the pension eligibility effect on the probability that a household is poor,
with poverty measured using a dummy equal to 1 if income is smaller than
the poverty line. Focusing on columns (7) and (8), when both spouses are
eligible the probability that income in a household is below the poverty line
is lower in households with a health insurance. However, the effect loses
significance when including in the regression baseline characteristics and
it is not robust to varying the bandwidth, as shown in Table A.3 in the
Appendix.
Table 4: Food consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total food expenditure Share food exp. over total expenditures
DF 50.868 26.939 85.674 77.085 -0.084 -0.079 -0.087 -0.021
(102.325) (106.688) (135.357) (138.403) (0.104) (0.092) (0.126) (0.117)
DM -20.425 -26.187 -35.561 -33.725 -0.052 -0.031 -0.048 -0.048
(83.680) (88.760) (111.683) (119.698) (0.093) (0.082) (0.111) (0.108)
DFM -61.417 -53.628 -48.927 -87.101 0.154 0.066 0.155 -0.009
(127.801) (131.624) (163.467) (165.406) (0.149) (0.130) (0.177) (0.160)
1+ health ins. (HI) -14.158 6.053 18.135 -0.023 -0.156 -0.019
(18.791) (117.156) (123.669) (0.024) (0.119) (0.110)
DF ∗HI -51.533 -108.504 0.011 -0.194
(152.648) (163.572) (0.170) (0.156)
DM ∗HI 104.846 90.517 0.019 0.058
(144.077) (159.304) (0.177) (0.160)
DFM ∗HI -185.227 10.571 0.047 0.396
(209.969) (218.230) (0.285) (0.274)
JE = DF +DM +DFM -30.975 -52.876 1.186 -43.741 0.018 -0.043 0.020 -0.077
P-value (JE=0) 0.748 0.587 0.992 0.734 0.858 0.635 0.868 0.468
HJE = HI(1 +DF +DM +DFM) -125.861 10.719 -0.079 0.241
P-value (HJE=0) 0.283 0.929 0.673 0.215
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045
Mean value (50-59) 296.343 0.441
S. D. (50-59) 353.385 0.319
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Finally, we quantify the extent to which pension eligibility induced
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higher food consumption, which is typically elastic to changes in income,
particularly in a developing country setting. Table 4 reports estimates ob-
tained using as outcome food consumption, measured both in bolivianos
and as percentage of total expenditure in a household. The eligibility ef-
fect on food consumption is not significant independently of whether the
outcome is measured in bolivianos or in percentage of total expenditure,
as shown in columns (1)-(4) and (5)-(8) respectively. When we look at the
point estimates of regressions using consumption in bolivianos as outcome,
we find that the eligibility effect for female spouses is positive while it is
negative for male spouses; when the outcome is consumption as percentage
of total expenditure, estimates are negative both for the female and male
spouse.15
5.2 Household composition
In this section we report evidence of the pension eligibility effect by focusing
on co-residence of elderly spouses’ grandchildren as one or more pensions
may give grandparents additional resources and decrease the opportunity
cost of childcare. Results on co-residence of elderly spouses’ adult children
or of extended family members are reported in the Appendix as they are
not significant. Table 5 shows estimates of the pension eligibility effect on
the probability that spouses’ grandchildren live with them, as well as on
educational expenditure. Columns (1) and(2) show that the probability
that grandchildren co-reside with their grandparents is higher when both
spouses are eligible, being significant (about 50 pp or 280%). While this
result becomes weakly significant when we allow for an heterogeneous ef-
fect by wealth in columns (3) and (4), the joint effect of eligibility for both
spouses reported at the bottom of the table is significant for all specifica-
tions.
Since grandchildren are typically in schooling age, we also assess whether
15The small difference in the number of observations reported in Table 4 relative to
the other tables reporting results is due to trimming three very suspicious outliers for
food consumption whose values is about 100,000 bolivianos. Results on the pension
eligibility effect on extreme poverty and labour supply are not reported as they are
either not significant or somewhat significant but not robust to varying the bandwidth.
However, they can be found in Table A.3-A.5 in the Appendix. We, instead, do not
report results obtained using as outcomes consumption of durables or total consumption
as they are not significant although they are available upon request.
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pension eligibility induces changes in educational expenditure. Columns (5)
to (8) in Table 5 show no significant effect on educational expenditure and
no significant difference by household wealth. Note that the number of ob-
servations in columns (5) to (8) is lower due to the higher frequency of miss-
ing values for the variable measuring educational expenditure. Overall, the
evidence in Table 5 suggests that eligible grandparents’ higher investment is
in time spent with their grandchildren and in bearing the associated costs,
rather than in educational expenditure. This evidence is complemented by
the one showing no change in the probability of co-residence for elderly
spouses’ adult children, which can be found in Table A.6 and A.7 in the
Appendix. The reason is that, contrary to related studies on South Africa
showing that young adults migrate when their parents become eligible for
a pension, we document that the intergenerational effect induced by the
Bolivian pension on non-beneficiaries affects only eligibles’ grandchildren.
Table 5: Co-residing grandchildren
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Co-residing grandchildren Educational expenditure
DF -0.074 -0.051 0.019 0.030 52.466 46.921 84.231 63.312
(0.174) (0.175) (0.195) (0.198) (74.233) (67.291) (83.513) (76.280)
DM -0.044 -0.024 0.002 0.038 2.977 -9.748 -11.187 -16.537
(0.148) (0.144) (0.170) (0.167) (39.747) (38.706) (44.996) (43.469)
DFM 0.497
∗∗ 0.484∗∗ 0.499∗ 0.487∗ -12.085 17.598 -39.266 15.417
(0.236) (0.234) (0.262) (0.264) (84.438) (75.480) (91.534) (82.960)
1+ health ins. (HI) 0.023 0.263 0.299 9.131 91.604 48.039
(0.040) (0.232) (0.225) (16.416) (71.982) (70.915)
DF ∗HI -0.245 -0.191 -176.311 -97.638
(0.403) (0.401) (111.920) (106.478)
DM ∗HI -0.229 -0.274 29.414 21.514
(0.320) (0.309) (96.063) (95.254)
DFM ∗HI -0.138 -0.173 185.160 50.918
(0.542) (0.536) (165.542) (157.315)
JE = DF +DM +DFM 0.379
∗∗ 0.409∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗ 43.357 54.772 33.778 62.193
P-value (JE=0) 0.021 0.011 0.004 0.002 0.291 0.161 0.415 0.130
HJE = HI(1 +DF +DM +DFM) -0.348 -0.339 129.867 22.833
P-value (HJE=0) 0.226 0.235 0.212 0.816
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 990 990 990 990
Mean value (55-59) 0.171 208.361
S. D. (55-59) 0.377 438.602
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
5.3 Robustness to varying age bandwidth
We now assess the robustness of our main result, i.e. a higher probability
of observing co-residing grandchildren in households with both spouses
eligible for a pension, to considering only households whose spouses’ age are
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Figure 6: Robustness of eligibility effect to varying the bandwidth
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as close as possible to the 60 cutoff. The smallest feasible bandwidth is 5
since with smaller values our model, which has a high number of interaction
terms, tends to be misspecified due to the low number of observations.
Figure 6 shows how estimates of the pension eligibility effect by spouse’s
gender on the probability of co-residing grandchildren, measured on the
vertical axis, vary with the bandwidth for male and female spouse age,
measured on the horizontal axis, using the same econometric specification
as in equation (1). We report estimates of the eligibility effect excluding
and adding controls, respectively in the left-hand side and right-hand side
panel in Figure 6. Overall, our main results are unchanged when we vary
the age bandwidth, except for bandwidth value 5 when our estimates are
weakly significant, which is at least in part due to the fact that the num-
ber of observations is smaller than 400, i.e. less than 40% of the number
of observations when the bandwidth value is 10. Estimates for poverty,
consumption, labor supply and for the probability of observing co-residing
adult children, along with estimates of the heterogeneous effect by wealth
are reported in Figure A.3 in the Appendix as they are not significant.16
In addition, we assess whether our main results are unchanged once we
account for the potential confounding effect of Bonosol, the non-contributory
16Our main results are unchanged when dropping observations of households receiving
a contributory pension, as the eligibility cutoff age for females coincides with the one
for Renta Dignidad, and when dropping households in which non-core members received
a Renta Dignidad pension. These results are not reported although they are available
upon request.
25
pension that was in place until 2007 with an age eligibility cutoff set at 65.
The reason is that when we consider bandwidth 5 our data sample contains,
for example, individuals who were 64 in 2007, did not receive Bonosol then
and started receiving Renta Dignidad in 2008. By contrast, it does not
contain individuals who were 65 or older and therefore they first received
Bonosol until it was discontinued and then started receiving Renta Dig-
nidad in 2008. To assess whether our main results vary when we drop from
the dataset only individuals who were 65 or older in 2008 or 2009, as they
may have been eligible for Bonosol, we set the left-hand side bandwidth
to 10, i.e. consider households in which both spouses are in the 50-60 age
range, and decrease the right-hand side bandwidth from 10 to 5. Estimates,
which are in line with our main results, are reported in Figure A.4 in the
Appendix.
5.4 Ant(post)icipation and placebo effects
In this section we, first, quantify anticipation effects. An example is a de-
crease in poverty in a household in which one spouse is close to turn 60
and decides to borrow in advance of becoming eligible for the Renta Dig-
nidad pension. We also quantify posticipation, i.e. lagged, effects to assess
if household decisions respond with a lag to the change in eligibility status.
Second, we quantify placebo effects, i.e. we test if households modify, for
example, consumption or labour supply when one or more spouses turn 60
even before the Renta Dignidad pension was enacted. This is particularly
important to quantify whether our main results are clean estimates of the
Renta Dignidad pension for females or whether they are confounded by the
contributory pension effect since the contributory pension age cutoff for
females is 60.
We start by quantifying anticipation and posticipation effects. We do
so by considering the same RDD empirical specification we used to ob-
tain our main results in equation (1), except that we now use as cutoff a
small(great)er age value than 60 for ant(post)icipation effects, while age
is rescaled accordingly. Figure 7 reports estimates of several regressions
for different age cutoff values in a compact form as follows: estimates of
the female, male spouse and spouses’ joint pension eligibility effect on the
probability of observing co-residing grandchildren in a household are mea-
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sured on the vertical axis for different age cutoff values measured on the
horizontal axis.
Figure 7: Ant(post)icipation effects of pension eligibility
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Figure 7 shows for an age cutoff value of 60 the effect of eligibility on
the probability of observing co-residing grandchildren, which is positive and
significant only when both spouses are eligible and was reported in Table
5. For values of the age cutoff smaller than 60, estimates quantify the
anticipation effect and vice versa a posticipation effect for values greater
than 60. Figure 7 shows that the only significant effect is at 60, thus offering
evidence in support of the absence of anticipation and of lagged effects.17
We now turn to quantifying placebo effects. We do this by considering,
as we did for ant(post)icipation effects, the same RDD empirical specifi-
cation we used to obtain our main results in equation (1), except that we
now estimate it using data from the 2006 and 2007 waves of the Bolivian
household survey. By doing so we can test whether our main result, i.e. a
higher probability of observing co-residing grandchildren in households in
which both spouses are eligible, is truly due to the Renta Dignidad pen-
sion eligibility, in which case we should find that estimates of the effect
that both spouses turn 60 in 2006-2007 are not significant, rather than
to the potentially confounding demographic effect of turning 60 or to the
contributory pension threshold for females which is set at 60.
17Estimates of the ant(post)icipation effect on the following outcomes: poverty
dummy, food consumption, labour supply by at least one spouse dummy and dum-
mies for co-residing adult children and for grandchildren can be found in Figure A.5 in
the Appendix.
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Figure 8: Placebo effects of pension eligibility using 2006-2007 data
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Figure 8 reports on the vertical axis estimates obtained with as out-
come the dummy equal to 1 if co-residing grandchildren are observed in a
household, as in Figure 7. The figure reports estimates from regressions
with different bandwidth values on the horizontal axis. We first focus on
bandwidth value 10, which is the one we used to obtain our main results.
Figure 8 shows that the effect of turning 60 is not significant neither for
each spouse separately nor for both spouses jointly, which suggests that our
main results are truly due to the pension eligibility rather than to spouses
turning 60. When we look at the estimates obtained using different band-
width values the results are unchanged.18
5.5 Eligibility effect disregarding gender
In addition to our main specification which studies the effect of pension
eligibility by gender, we also study the effect of eligibility of at least one
spouse in a household, to critically assess what results we would forego by
not accounting for spouses’ eligibility by gender. This is done by following
as guidance the specification used in Escobar Loza et al. (2013). They
define as treated those households in which the eldest individual was eligible
for the pension, which implies that at least an individual is eligible as
younger individuals in the households may also be eligible; controls are
18Estimates of the placebo effect on the following outcomes: poverty dummy, con-
sumption, labour supply by at least one spouse dummy and dummies for co-residing
adult children and for grandchildren can be found in Figure A.6 in the Appendix.
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defined as those households with no individual eligible since the eldest is
not eligible, which implies that younger individuals are not eligible either.
The effect is estimated by using a RDD in which the running variable is
the maximum age. The difference in our specification not accounting for
gender differences relative to the one in Escobar Loza et al. (2013) is that
we focus on spouses rather than on all individuals in a household since in
99% of households the eldest individual coincides with the eldest spouse
when the age range is within 50-70.
Table 6: Effect of eligibility of the eldest spouse in a household on grand-
children’s co-residence and educ. expenditure
Co-residing grandchildren Educ. expenditure (bol.)
DMaxA 0.060 0.064 -124.566 20.334
(0.050) (0.068) (240.008) (57.374)
(MaxA-60) 0.010∗∗ -0.000 -102.494 -5.658
(0.005) (0.018) (106.469) (12.176)
DMaxA*(MaxA-60) -0.006 0.009 155.655 -7.809
(0.009) (0.025) (172.306) (18.631)
N 1,551 831 1,551 831
Mean value (inel. HH) 0.167 0.171 1264.487 1174.655
S.d. (inel. HH) 0.373 0.377 31493.721 30331.384
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth 10 5 10 5
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6 reports estimates of the effect of eligibility for the eldest spouse
in a household, using a RDD with the maximum age between spouses
as running variable. Table 6 shows that the effect on the probability of
observing co-residing grandchildren is positive but not significant. The
effect on educational expenditure is not significant either and the sign varies
with the bandwidth used. We do not report estimates obtained using the
eldest individual in a household as they are little different although they
are available upon request.19
19Table A.8 in the Appendix reports estimates of the eligibility effect for the eldest
spouse in a household on take-up, food expenditure and labour supply, with no estimate
being significant. Table A.8 also reports estimates of the effect that both spouses are
eligible, which we obtained using a RDD with the minimum age between spouses as
running variable. The only significant estimate is a negative effect on labour supply by
female spouses.
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6 Discussion
Our RDD estimates show that, although eligibility for the Renta Dignidad
pension separately by spouse gender increases take-up, poverty incidence
is not lower in households with at least one spouse eligible for the pension.
In addition, they show that the main behavioural response of eligibility is
a change in household composition, with two eligible grandparents being
more likely to live with one or more grandchildren. Our paper complements
the growing number of related studies on social pensions in Mexico, in Latin
American countries and in South Africa by shedding light on the role of
eligibility by spouse gender, which has been little studied to the best of
our knowledge and, therefore, has not been linked to the impact on (non-
)beneficiaries.
Differently from two closely related studies on the same pension in Bo-
livia, ours does not find that in the short-run the pension decreases poverty
nor female labour supply. Relative to Escobar Loza et al. (2013), when we
replicate their setup which focuses on eligibility by gender of the eldest
household member, we find that spouses, separately by gender, are in 99%
of the households the eldest members, that the impact on poverty is non-
significant, in line with our results accounting by spouses’ gender, and that
the impact on co-residing grandchildren is also not significant, differently
from the positive effect we find when both spouses are eligible. This is
partly due to accounting for gender differences although it may be also
due to the fact that our datasets are not the same since Escobar Loza
et al. (2013) obtain a dataset of households with the eldest individual in
the 55-65 age range and with a greater number of observations than in the
household survey data we used. Relative to Hernani-Limarino and Mena
(2015), the main differences are, first, that they focus on eligibility of the el-
dest individual in a household, like Escobar Loza et al. (2013) and, second,
that they also use data on the previous pension, Bonosol, to implement a
refinement of a difference in difference design.
From a policy viewpoint, our results suggest that in a country with
widespread poverty, such as Bolivia, a social pension seems to lead to
potential intergenerational “spillovers” onto beneficiaries’ extended fam-
ily which may have not been anticipated at the policy design stage. This
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suggests that a thorough analysis of the impact of a social pension encom-
passes both gender roles and indirect behavioural responses to the pension
income shock, rather than just poverty rates or labour supply as main
proxies for well-being.
A few caveats in our analysis should be noted. First, behavioural re-
sponses to the pension are observed shortly after individuals have become
eligible, i.e. in the short-run, while less is known about their long-run im-
pact. This is due to the cross-sectional nature of the survey data which
does not allow us to follow households over time. Second, the eligibility
effect has been estimated around the age 60 cutoff while it may be different
for eligible individuals at different ages. Third, in our analysis we estimated
the intent-to-treat effect as take-up is endogenous, which makes us mainly
interested in the sign of our estimates rather than their magnitude.
Our paper paves the way for future related research. First, it would be
valuable to quantify whether benefits accruing to households with eligible
spouses also indirectly “spillover” onto households in their social network
or located nearby but with no eligible spouse since the focus of social pen-
sion studies is almost entirely on eligibles. Second, it would be valuable
to test whether and to what extent the timing of information disclosure
about social pensions enactment play a relevant role in explaining take-
up and behavioural decisions of households with (no) eligible members.
Third, in addition to married couples, extending our focus to widows may
be helpful to learn about the eligibility effect in single-spouse households
and also about the loss-of-eligibility effect in the event of the death of an
eligible spouse in a household. Assessing the empirical relevance of these
aspects will help policy-makers anticipating their potential impact on the
subsequent analysis of a social pension effect.
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Online Appendix
Table A.1: Missing spouse by pension eligibility for the other spouse
Missing female spouse dummy Missing male spouse dummy
DM -0.019 -0.018 -0.016 -0.011
(0.044) (0.044) (0.060) (0.060)
(AM-60) 0.009∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.008
(0.005) (0.004) (0.016) (0.015)
DM*(AM-60) 0.002 0.001 0.021 0.027
(0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.021)
DF -0.023 -0.010 0.007 -0.005
(0.051) (0.050) (0.071) (0.069)
(AF-60) 0.004 0.010∗ 0.004 0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.016)
DF*(AF-60) 0.014 0.010 0.007 0.012
(0.009) (0.009) (0.025) (0.025)
Constant 0.215∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.042) (0.045) (0.060) (0.034) (0.046) (0.048) (0.066)
N 1,874 1,874 970 970 1,914 1,914 926 926
Mean value (inel. HH) 0.176 0.176 0.205 0.205 0.304 0.304 0.313 0.313
S.d. (inel. HH) 0.381 0.381 0.404 0.404 0.460 0.460 0.464 0.464
Covariates 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Bandwidth 10 10 5 5 10 10 5 5
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.2: Pension take-up probability by spouse gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Females Males
DF 0.660
∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗ 0.064 0.058 0.073 0.058
(0.121) (0.118) (0.101) (0.099) (0.067) (0.075) (0.087) (0.090)
DM -0.016 -0.024 0.051 0.059 0.607
∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.069) (0.055) (0.058) (0.106) (0.102) (0.128) (0.125)
DFM -0.090 -0.058 -0.389
∗∗ -0.361∗∗ -0.173 -0.146 -0.211 -0.175
(0.167) (0.163) (0.167) (0.164) (0.164) (0.160) (0.199) (0.195)
1+ health ins. (HI) -0.007 0.236∗ 0.191 -0.045∗∗ -0.023 -0.046
(0.025) (0.123) (0.120) (0.022) (0.028) (0.035)
DF ∗HI -0.690∗∗ -0.690∗∗ -0.066 -0.010
(0.334) (0.320) (0.087) (0.100)
DM ∗HI -0.203 -0.221 0.385∗∗ 0.375∗∗
(0.169) (0.170) (0.174) (0.169)
DFM ∗HI 1.153∗∗∗ 1.132∗∗∗ 0.464∗ 0.372
(0.386) (0.371) (0.240) (0.240)
JE = DF +DM +DFM 0.554
∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗
P-value (JE=0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.003
HJE = HI(1 +DF +DM +DFM) 0.496
∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗
P-value (HJE=0) 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.000
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048
Mean value (50-59) 0.026 0.008
S. D. (50-59) 0.160 0.089
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.3: Extreme poverty prob.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DF -0.333
∗∗ -0.316∗∗ -0.312∗ -0.218
(0.144) (0.135) (0.179) (0.173)
DM -0.115 -0.058 -0.019 0.020
(0.153) (0.133) (0.198) (0.177)
DFM 0.492
∗∗ 0.373∗ 0.437∗ 0.225
(0.213) (0.194) (0.263) (0.243)
1+ health ins. (HI) -0.114∗∗∗ -0.201 -0.012
(0.032) (0.179) (0.174)
DF ∗HI -0.078 -0.303
(0.244) (0.248)
DM ∗HI -0.260 -0.246
(0.265) (0.234)
DFM ∗HI 0.071 0.472
(0.341) (0.334)
JE = DF +DM +DFM 0.044 -0.002 0.106 0.027
P-value (JE=0) 0.774 0.989 0.579 0.887
HJE = HI(1 +DF +DM +DFM) -0.468
∗∗∗ -0.090
P-value (HJE=0) 0.001 0.571
Covariates No Yes No Yes
N 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048
Mean value (50-59) 0.299
S. D. (50-59) 0.458
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A.4: Labor supply (1+ spouse)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DF 0.017 0.045 -0.068 -0.038
(0.084) (0.086) (0.043) (0.047)
DM -0.054 -0.005 -0.073
∗ -0.058
(0.066) (0.059) (0.040) (0.044)
DFM -0.140 -0.180 0.045 0.025
(0.129) (0.120) (0.073) (0.078)
1+ health ins. (HI) -0.003 -0.116 -0.084
(0.023) (0.108) (0.104)
DF ∗HI 0.168 0.123
(0.270) (0.272)
DM ∗HI 0.000 0.004
(0.178) (0.176)
DFM ∗HI -0.630 -0.586
(0.432) (0.434)
JE = DF +DM +DFM -0.177
∗∗ -0.141∗ -0.096 -0.072
P-value (JE=0) 0.046 0.076 0.124 0.294
HJE = HI(1 +DF +DM +DFM) -0.578
∗ -0.543∗
P-value (HJE=0) 0.060 0.076
Covariates No Yes No Yes
N 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048
Mean value (50-59) 0.950
S. D. (50-59) 0.219
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.5: Labor supply
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Females Males
DF -0.210 -0.194 -0.371
∗ -0.324∗ 0.026 0.061 -0.048 0.001
(0.178) (0.169) (0.192) (0.185) (0.113) (0.118) (0.119) (0.124)
DM -0.066 -0.022 -0.294
∗ -0.267 -0.024 0.032 -0.027 -0.012
(0.150) (0.144) (0.174) (0.170) (0.105) (0.104) (0.125) (0.130)
DFM 0.197 0.147 0.483
∗ 0.391 -0.230 -0.291∗ -0.061 -0.119
(0.242) (0.234) (0.274) (0.270) (0.167) (0.161) (0.167) (0.170)
1+ health ins. (HI) -0.071 -0.606∗∗∗ -0.557∗∗∗ 0.009 -0.067 -0.036
(0.051) (0.193) (0.192) (0.030) (0.159) (0.155)
DF ∗HI 0.414 0.264 0.141 0.025
(0.406) (0.396) (0.294) (0.294)
DM ∗HI 0.695∗∗ 0.691∗∗ -0.039 -0.041
(0.293) (0.291) (0.232) (0.227)
DFM ∗HI -0.872 -0.607 -0.622 -0.480
(0.557) (0.554) (0.470) (0.470)
JE = DF +DM +DFM -0.079 -0.069 -0.181 -0.201 -0.228 -0.198 -0.135 -0.130
P-value (JE=0) 0.621 0.659 0.286 0.244 0.086 0.115 0.378 0.395
HJE = HI(1 +DF +DM +DFM) -0.369 -0.209 -0.588
∗ -0.532
P-value (HJE=0) 0.237 0.515 0.071 0.101
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048
Mean value (50-59) 0.624 0.922
S. D. (50-59) 0.485 0.269
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A.6: Co-residing adult children of elderly couples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DF -0.225 -0.231 -0.239 -0.281
(0.172) (0.159) (0.192) (0.190)
DM -0.113 -0.126 -0.087 -0.098
(0.140) (0.143) (0.173) (0.179)
DFM 0.386 0.423
∗ 0.312 0.396
(0.241) (0.230) (0.276) (0.273)
1+ health ins. (HI) -0.024 -0.100 -0.152
(0.042) (0.192) (0.196)
DF ∗HI -0.046 0.074
(0.378) (0.337)
DM ∗HI -0.158 -0.139
(0.291) (0.288)
DFM ∗HI 0.352 0.132
(0.550) (0.528)
JE = DF +DM +DFM 0.048 0.066 -0.014 0.018
P-value (JE=0) 0.760 0.680 0.938 0.922
HJE = HI(1 +DF +DM +DFM) 0.048 -0.085
P-value (HJE=0) 0.885 0.808
Covariates No Yes No Yes
N 1,048 1,048 1,048 1,048
Mean value (50-59) 0.795
S. D. (50-59) 0.404
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.7: Share of educational expenditure over total expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DF 0.007 0.005 -0.067 -0.088
(0.105) (0.098) (0.117) (0.110)
DM -0.099 -0.101 -0.104 -0.109
(0.066) (0.064) (0.083) (0.080)
DFM 0.041 0.074 0.104 0.171
(0.118) (0.110) (0.131) (0.123)
1+ health ins. (HI) 0.018 0.064 0.013
(0.025) (0.110) (0.109)
DF ∗HI 0.369 0.427∗
(0.279) (0.251)
DM ∗HI -0.007 -0.004
(0.133) (0.130)
DFM ∗HI -0.295 -0.426
(0.310) (0.284)
JE = DF +DM +DFM -0.051 -0.021 -0.066 -0.026
P-value (JE=0) 0.439 0.745 0.405 0.743
HJE = HI(1 +DF +DM +DFM) 0.131 0.010
P-value (HJE=0) 0.245 0.930
Covariates No Yes No Yes
N 991 991 991 991
Mean value (50-59) 0.282
S. D. (50-59) 0.595
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.8: Effect of pension eligibility for 1+ spouse versus no (2 versus 0 or 1) using max(min) age
Female take-up Male take-up Take-up amount (bolivianos)
DMaxA 0.182∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 125.777∗∗∗ 129.567∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.052) (0.039) (0.052) (10.707) (13.491)
(MaxA-60) 0.001 0.005 -0.001 -0.006 0.178 0.148
(0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.004) (0.506) (1.547)
DMaxA*(MaxA-60) 0.053∗∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 20.160∗∗∗ 17.770∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.019) (0.006) (0.018) (1.966) (5.018)
DMinA 0.611∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.102∗ -0.021 137.203∗∗∗ 93.788∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.065) (0.060) (0.087) (15.594) (21.564)
(MinA-60) 0.006∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 7.747∗∗∗ 15.443∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.010) (0.006) (0.019) (1.391) (4.163)
DMinA*(MinA-60) 0.029∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.010 0.010 7.358∗∗∗ 10.431
(0.008) (0.019) (0.010) (0.028) (2.640) (6.774)
Constant 0.008 0.023 -0.002 0.021 0.004 0.011 0.417∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 4.254 8.717 82.722∗∗∗ 110.037∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.033) (0.027) (0.043) (0.025) (0.036) (0.055) (0.081) (7.366) (10.129) (12.705) (19.440)
N 1,551 831 1,276 628 1,551 831 1,276 628 1,551 831 1,276 628
Mean value (inel. HH) 0.300 0.336 0.332 0.377 0.290 0.330 0.308 0.334 93.063 102.763 99.071 107.085
S.d. (inel. HH) 0.458 0.472 0.471 0.485 0.454 0.470 0.462 0.472 136.827 140.559 140.078 143.908
Covariates 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidth 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Continued on the next page
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Poverty Extreme poverty
DMaxA 0.052 0.004 0.010 -0.001
(0.051) (0.070) (0.046) (0.064)
(MaxA-60) -0.010∗ 0.003 -0.004 -0.011
(0.006) (0.017) (0.006) (0.017)
DMaxA*(MaxA-60) 0.004 0.006 -0.008 0.014
(0.010) (0.024) (0.008) (0.023)
DMinA 0.049 0.056 -0.070 -0.048
(0.058) (0.079) (0.053) (0.075)
(MinA-60) -0.008 -0.012 0.001 -0.006
(0.006) (0.018) (0.006) (0.018)
DMinA*(MinA-60) -0.001 0.007 -0.010 0.004
(0.010) (0.028) (0.009) (0.025)
Constant 0.734∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.069) (0.054) (0.076) (0.046) (0.067) (0.052) (0.078)
N 1,551 831 1,276 628 1,551 831 1,276 628
Mean value (inel. HH) 0.440 0.436 0.436 0.431 0.230 0.224 0.225 0.217
S.d. (inel. HH) 0.496 0.496 0.496 0.495 0.421 0.417 0.418 0.412
Covariates 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidth 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Continued on the next page
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Female spouse labour supply Male spouse labour supply 1+ spouse labour supply
DMaxA -0.057 -0.122 -0.008 -0.045 -0.017 -0.053∗
(0.056) (0.077) (0.034) (0.046) (0.024) (0.029)
(MaxA-60) 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.018 0.003 0.017∗∗
(0.006) (0.019) (0.003) (0.014) (0.002) (0.008)
DMaxA*(MaxA-60) -0.010 -0.000 -0.012∗ -0.033∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.025∗∗
(0.010) (0.027) (0.007) (0.018) (0.006) (0.012)
DMinA -0.237∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗ -0.031 -0.023 -0.057 -0.065
(0.063) (0.084) (0.048) (0.063) (0.037) (0.048)
(MinA-60) 0.010 0.018 0.001 -0.000 0.003 -0.000
(0.007) (0.019) (0.004) (0.016) (0.003) (0.011)
DMinA*(MinA-60) -0.007 -0.002 -0.011 -0.023 -0.011 -0.006
(0.012) (0.030) (0.009) (0.023) (0.008) (0.019)
Constant 0.658∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗ 0.978∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ 0.935∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.073) (0.057) (0.079) (0.029) (0.039) (0.039) (0.054) (0.019) (0.022) (0.028) (0.037)
N 1,551 831 1,276 628 1,551 831 1,276 628 1,551 831 1,276 628
Mean value (inel. HH) 0.606 0.604 0.604 0.602 0.739 0.709 0.715 0.689 0.862 0.843 0.846 0.829
S.d. (inel. HH) 0.489 0.489 0.489 0.489 0.439 0.454 0.452 0.463 0.345 0.363 0.361 0.377
Covariates 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidth 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Food expenditure (bolivianos) Food expenditure (% total exp.)
DMaxA -4.434 0.550 0.030 0.040
(27.670) (35.909) (0.028) (0.038)
(MaxA-60) 1.519 4.331 0.005 0.002
(3.071) (8.589) (0.003) (0.010)
DMaxA*(MaxA-60) 7.923 1.857 0.000 -0.001
(5.769) (13.888) (0.005) (0.014)
DMinA 7.685 -0.179 -0.048 -0.028
(34.578) (44.074) (0.037) (0.048)
(MinA-60) -0.385 4.930 0.012∗∗∗ 0.007
(4.210) (11.242) (0.004) (0.011)
DMinA*(MinA-60) 5.514 -5.990 0.001 -0.001
(7.083) (15.885) (0.007) (0.017)
Constant 272.542∗∗∗ 295.724∗∗∗ 267.734∗∗∗ 321.482∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗
(26.158) (35.603) (32.091) (43.496) (0.027) (0.037) (0.033) (0.048)
N 1,548 829 1,273 626 1,547 828 1,272 625
Mean value (inel. HH) 354.286 363.935 364.937 372.841 0.470 0.486 0.486 0.499
S.d. (inel. HH) 393.328 404.765 404.235 412.286 0.321 0.322 0.322 0.322
Covariates 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidth 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Continued on the next page
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Co-residing grandchildren Educational expenditure (bolivianos) Educational expenditure (% total exp.)
DMaxA 0.060 0.064 -124.566 20.334 -0.002 0.000
(0.050) (0.068) (240.008) (57.374) (0.021) (0.029)
(MaxA-60) 0.010∗∗ -0.000 -102.494 -5.658 -0.003 -0.002
(0.005) (0.018) (106.469) (12.176) (0.003) (0.007)
DMaxA*(MaxA-60) -0.006 0.009 155.655 -7.809 -0.003 -0.005
(0.009) (0.025) (172.306) (18.631) (0.004) (0.009)
DMinA 0.091 0.073 416.935 84.134 -0.012 -0.017
(0.062) (0.085) (434.370) (76.267) (0.022) (0.029)
(MinA-60) 0.016∗∗∗ 0.028 -138.137 -17.479 -0.005∗ -0.007
(0.006) (0.019) (136.287) (14.829) (0.003) (0.007)
DMinA*(MinA-60) -0.035∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗ 152.711 25.094 0.002 0.012
(0.011) (0.028) (171.756) (25.734) (0.004) (0.011)
Constant 0.231∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ -445.329 85.201 -610.336 -8.282 0.071∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.035
(0.044) (0.060) (0.054) (0.074) (551.898) (55.709) (701.068) (47.702) (0.020) (0.029) (0.020) (0.030)
N 1,551 831 1,276 628 1,551 831 1,276 628 1,550 830 1,275 627
Mean value (inel. HH) 0.167 0.171 0.170 0.171 1264.487 1174.655 1364.989 1271.818 0.107 0.100 0.101 0.095
S.d. (inel. HH) 0.373 0.377 0.376 0.377 31493.721 30331.384 33012.813 31858.207 0.174 0.170 0.170 0.166
Covariates 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidth 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure A.1: Balance of baseline characteristics at the age 60 cutoff by
bandwidth
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Figure A.1 continued from the previous page...
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Figure A.1 continued from the previous page...
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Figure A.1 continued from the previous page...
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Figure A.2: Balance of baseline characteristics at the age 60 cutoff
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Figure A.2 continued from the previous page...
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Figure A.3: Robustness of eligibility effect to varying the bandwidth
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Figure A.3 continued from the previous page...
400
600
800
1000
N
-1
-.5
0
.5
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
Male eligible (DM)
-.5
0
.5
1
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
Female eligible (DF)
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
DF*DM
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
p-
va
l J
E=
0
0
.05
.1
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
JE=DF+DM+DF*DM
Poverty (spouses' age, no cov.s)
(a)
400
600
800
1000
N
-1
-.5
0
.5
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
Male eligible (DM)
-.5
0
.5
1
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
Female eligible (DF)
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
DF*DM
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
p-
va
l J
E=
0
-.2
-.1
0
.1
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
JE=DF+DM+DF*DM
Poverty (spouses' age, cov.s 1+elder)
(b)
400
600
800
1000
N
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
Male eligible (DM)
-.5
0
.5
1
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
Female eligible (DF)
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
DF*DM
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
p-
va
l J
E=
0
.02
.04
.06
.08
.1
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
JE=DF+DM+DF*DM
-2
-1
0
1
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
DM*HI
-2
-1
0
1
2
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
DF*HI
-2
-1
0
1
2
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
DF*DM*HI
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
p-
va
l J
E=
0
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
JE=(DF+DM+DF*DM)*HI
Poverty (spouses' age, no cov.s)
(c)
400
600
800
1000
N
-1
-.5
0
.5
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
Male eligible (DM)
-.5
0
.5
1
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
Female eligible (DF)
-1.5
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
DF*DM
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
p-
va
l J
E=
0
-.2
-.15
-.1
-.05
0
.05
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
JE=DF+DM+DF*DM
-2
-1
0
1
2
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
DM*HI
-2
-1
0
1
2
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
DF*HI
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
DF*DM*HI
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
p-
va
l J
E=
0
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
JE=(DF+DM+DF*DM)*HI
Poverty (spouses' age, cov.s 1+elder)
(d)
Continued on the next page...
20
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Figure A.4: Robustness of eligibility effect to varying the right-hand side
bandwidth
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Figure A.5: Ant(post)icipation effects of pension eligibility
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Figure A.6: Placebo effect of pension eligibility
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Figure A.6 continued from the previous page...
200
400
600
800
1000
N
-200
-100
0
100
200
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
Male eligible (DM)
-200
-100
0
100
200
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
Female eligible (DF)
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
DF*DM
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
p-
va
l J
E=
0
-20
0
20
40
60
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
JE=DF+DM+DF*DM
Total food exp. (spouses' age, no cov.s)
200
400
600
800
1000
N
-200
-100
0
100
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
Male eligible (DM)
-100
0
100
200
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
Female eligible (DF)
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
DF*DM
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
p-
va
l J
E=
0
-50
0
50
5 6 7 8 9 10
Bandwidth
JE=DF+DM+DF*DM
Total food exp. (spouses' age, cov.s 1+elder)
Continued on the next page...
35
Figure A.6 continued from the previous page...
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Figure A.6 continued from the previous page...
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Figure A.6 continued from the previous page...
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